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1. Introduction
It is commonly acknowledged in science that model construction is one of the 
most important components of theorizing. Philosophers of science are gradually com­
ing to acknowledge this situation, spurred on by holders of the semantic view of theo­
ries. In this paper I wish to defend a very deflationary version of the semantic view of 
theories, which is more or less a re-statement of the above commonplace. I reject the 
view encapsulated in the identity statement “scientific theories are families of mod­
els," although acknowledging the useful insights into science that holders of this 
strong position have given us. My position derives from a critique of various of the 
semantic views of theories, and further from a guiding presupposition that rather than 
providing necessary and sufficient conditions for what a theory is, philosophers 
should focus on the nature of scientific theorizing. Theorizing is carried out by prac­
ticing scientists, and we cannot say what scientific theories are unless we appreciate 
the myriad ways they are used and developed in all of the sciences.
The paper proceeds by investigating some key aspects of the semantic view of theo­
ries. I concentrate particularly on the notion of a model, and less on the various notions 
of “theory” that appear in the literature. Having cleared up some issues to do with the 
nature of models, I defend the claim that mathematical and meta-mathematical models 
are clearly different from scientific models. Next, I criticize the strong view that theo­
ries are families of models by looking at various examples that show the semantic view 
“merely” provides descriptions of particular cases of theorizing, rather than providing a 
general account of the nature of theories. Finally, I propose a more liberal or deflation­
ary view, which is consistent with a naturalistic approach to the philosophy of science.
2. Working Definition of the Semantic View of Theories
In this section I introduce a working definition of the semantic view of theories. 
There are several formulations of the semantic view and many differences between 
each of these formulations. In the definition given here I am erring toward a strong 
version of the semantic view, but it is not a version held by any particular semantic 
theorist. The definition simply helps distinguish the view from other prominent views
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such as the “received view” (Suppe 1977), which is, roughly speaking, the view de­
rived from logical empiricists that theories can be adequately reconstructed as sets of 
axioms and correspondence rules.
Here is the definition: Scientific theories consist of families of (mathematical) 
models including empirical models and sets of hypotheses stating the connections be­
tween the empirical models and empirical systems. Empirical models are models that 
specifically purport to have relations to an empirical system. There are many models 
in science that clearly do not purport to represent empirical systems and yet are still 
important in scientific theorizing. From here on I will follow Van Fraassen’s (1980a) 
usage and refer to “empirical systems”. Giere (1988) uses “real systems” in its place 
and I think this leads to misleading presuppositions about realism. The use of the 
phrase “empirical systems” allows for the discussion in this paper to remain mute 
about the realism/anti-realism debates (cf, Lloyd 1988).
The above definition is closest to Giere's (1988) and perhaps neither Van Fraassen 
nor Suppes would include the second clause. The important thing to note is that the 
models are the central feature. The view emphasizes semantic objects over syntactic 
objects, taking the lead from semantics in meta-mathematics. On the semantic view, 
whatever linguistic components a theory has, they are incidental to any serious under­
standing of that theory’s nature. In the next section I give some examples of models 
to illustrate the diversity of the concept.
3. Theories and Models
In this section I will pay most attention to models, but a brief word is in order 
about the other side of the definition “theories”. Predominantly philosophers have 
worked with a somewhat unexamined notion of theories. Although much work has 
gone into attempting to answer the question “What are scientific theories?” there is no 
real consensus over what the scope of the investigation is. Much work in philosophy 
of science has proceeded under the assumption that Classical Mechanics is a good ex­
ample of a scientific theory, and so if we can explain what that is, we have a start on 
explaining what theories are in general. There are many axiomatizations of classical 
mechanics (e.g., Simon 1954) that under the received view count as attempts to an­
swer the question.
What has been revealed by closer examination of the practice of science is that the 
term “theory” does not simply denote the finished product of years of research formu­
lated in its most elegant fashion as served up in advanced text books. Many fields 
have general overarching theories, middle level, and low level theories. Biology pro­
vides an example of a field in which there are clearly several different levels of theo­
rizing, each of which are crucially inter-related. Further, there is no clear candidate for 
“the theory of evolution” (cf. Hull 1988).
Another direction that discussion of theories has taken has been to promote any­
one’s account of anything as presupposing a theory. Examples abound in the philo­
sophical literature on cognitive science of our folk theories of psychology, physics, 
and even middle sized every day objects (e.g., Churchland 1986). For example, on 
this account, I not only possess a theory of the cell, which I invoke in recognizing 
cells, but also a theory of chairs.
A middle course between the extremes of accepting only fully developed and for­
malized scientific theories, and promoting any set of concepts that guide perception 
seems the most sensible. How one identifies candidate theories should be derived
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from an investigation of scientific practice. There is no really clear guide in scientific 
practice to what counts as theorizing, but several rules o f thumb can be adopted to 
recognize such practices. Obviously many theoretical presuppositions are invoked in 
even the most mundane types of scientific practice, but it seems clear that tissue slic­
ing and staining are not theorizing. Predicting various matches between a mathemati­
cal model and a yet to be established experimental set-up clearly is theorizing. Most 
proponents of the semantic view take off from a close look at a particular piece of sci­
entific theorizing when developing their account of the nature of theories in general, 
and this is a reasonable approach.
There are many referents for the term “model”, and it is my contention that there 
are far greater differences between models in mathematics and logic and models in sci­
ence than holders of the semantic view have been prepared to admit. Both Suppes and 
Van Fraassen have played down the distinction between models in logic and in sci­
ence, Suppes says “1 would assert that the meaning of the concept o f model is the same 
in mathematics and the empirical sciences” (1960, p. 289). Van Fraassen makes a simi­
lar point; the usages of model in meta-mathematics and in the sciences are not as 
far apart as has sometimes been said” (1980, p. 44). Suppes and Van Fraassen’s views 
derive from the way they approach the philosophy of science, and this is a topic 1 will 
return to later. First, I will elaborate what do seem to be some clear differences be­
tween models in science and models in meta-mathematics, I use some elementary ex­
amples to set out some of the differences, in the sections below I will introduce some 
more examples as I develop my criticisms of the strong version of the semantic view.
Let us look at two straightforward examples of models in mathematics and meta­
mathematics. Consider the following set of postulates:
1. Any two members of K are contained in just one member of L.
2. No member of K is contained in more than two members of L.
3. The members of K are not all contained in a single member of L.
4. Any two members of L contain just one member of K.
5. No member of L contains more than two members of K. (Nagel & 
Newman 1958, p. 16)
A model for these postulates is a triangle with vertices K and sides L. The model sat­
isfies any theorems derived from these postulates and shows us that the postulates are 
consistent. The model provides us with a semantics for the set of postulates.
Now consider a slightly more complex example. We can derive all of arithmetic 
from the Peano Axioms (let us just for arguments sake ignore Godel’s result here). 
The set that provides a model for the Peano Axioms is the set of integers plus zero. 
Things are slightly more complex in this case, as we need various orderings on the set 
to satisfy theorems derivable from the Peano Axioms. One way to do this is by
Tarski’s method of sequences, so the set {2,2,4...... } satisfies “2+2=4". So a model
for arithmetic is the set of sequences produced from various orderings on the integers.
These very elementary examples give us much of what we need to understand how 
models work in meta-mathematics. The crucial relation is a relation of satisfaction be­
tween a set of postulates, theorems, or axioms and a set of some type of objects or 
other. The latter set can be expressed as a more concrete geometric model as in the 
first case, or specified in a more abstract manner as in the second case. The one fur­
ther notion that is important for our purposes is “embedding”. Think of postulates 1 
through 5 above as a describing a theory T; this theory is satisfied by the triangle, but 
the triangle can be embedded in the larger structure of a Euclidian plane because it is
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isomorphic to part of that plane. On this account our theory T can be embedded in the 
larger theory T , which is Euclidian Geometry, because the model for T is isomorphic 
with part of the model for T  (cf. Van Fraassen 1980a, p. 43), Embedding is a relation 
between models, and relies on the isomorphism of one model with part of another. In 
our other example the sequence (2,2,4....} can be embedded in the set of all sequences 
of integers. The notion of embedding works well in the meta-mathematical cases be­
cause isomorphism is so well defined. In the scientific case isomorphism is a harder 
relation to define.
Let us now consider a few models from science. Again these are very simple ex­
amples, The first is taken from Maynard-Smith by Lloyd (1988), The description of 
population growth in ecological theory can be expressed mathematically by “the lo­
gistic equation”, dx/dt = rx(l - x/k). Here x is the population density at time t, r is the 
intrinsic rate of increase, and k is the carrying capacity of the environment. As Lloyd 
points out, Maynard-Smith observes the following: “ [the equation] was not derived 
from any knowledge of, or assumptions about, the precise way in which the reproduc­
tion of individuals is influenced by density; it is merely the simplest mathematical ex­
pression for a particular pattern of growth” (1988, p. 15). The equation presents a set 
of relations between particular mathematical objects, and it Is this structure that the 
equation defines that is a model.
We can go on to make comparisons between the model and actual experimental 
systems. If we take an experimental population and plot its growth, and the curve 
matches closely the curve for the logistic equation, then we can claim that the model is 
isomorphic to the real system. The term isomorphism is being used in a different sense 
here than in the mathematical examples, and I will comment on this below. What we 
need now to note is that the model is a mathematical structure defined by the logistic 
equation, and it may or may not have relations to particular empirical systems.
Giere introduces an example from classical mechanics. Consider the following 
equation: m d-x/dt2- = -(mg/l)x. This is the equation of motion for the horizontal com­
ponent x of the motion of a pendulum with length, 1, mass, m, where gravity is g. This 
equation is for a small angle of swing, a, cos(a) = 1. Such a pendulum is a model. The 
equation describes this particular pendulum, or in the language of the meta-mathemat­
ical examples the pendulum satisfies the equation.
In this example there are no empirical systems corresponding to the pendulum.
The equations describing the pendulum in my high-school physics laboratory, or any 
form of existing linear oscillator, require many added parameters for the resistance of 
the air and the size of the angle, a, and so on. The pendulum that satisfies the equation 
of motion above is an abstract system or a model that satisfies just that equation.
Finally, consider a typical biology textbook drawing of a cell. In most texts a 
schematized cell is presented that contains a nucleus, a cell membrane, mitochondria, 
a Golgi body, endoplasmic reticulum and so on. In a botany text the schematized cell 
will contain chloroplasts and an outer cell wall, whilst in a zoology text it will not in­
clude these items. The cell is a model in a large group of inter-related models that en­
able us to understand the operations of all cells. The model is not a nerve cell, nor is it 
a muscle cell, nor a pancreatic cell, it stands for all of these.
Many other models are presented in cell biology when one graphically zooms in 
on the inside of the cell. For example, when energy transfer is considered we look at a 
model of a mitochondrion. In the case of the cell there is no mathematical object, and 
there are no equations describing it, and yet the schematic drawing is not of any one
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particular cell; it is an idealized cell or model. Just as the model of the mitochondria is 
not a drawing of any particular mitochondria.
We have enough examples now to bring out some of the important differences be­
tween mathematical and the scientific models. There are two important differences, 
one centering on satisfaction and the other centering on isomorphism and the related 
concept of embedding. Let us take the satisfaction issue first.
In the mathematical case the triangle satisfies the postulates of theory T, and this is 
all the work it has to do. In the case of the logistic equation what we have is a system 
that satisfies an equation also, but this is not all it does. The difference between the 
mathematical and the scientific case can be put schematically as follows; Let = = >  be 
“satisfies”.
Mathematics:
MODEL = >  {Linguistic description of theory. Equations
Science:
(Empirical System)=?=MODEL=>{linguistic description of theory, Equations,...}
First, consider the cell example as an instantiation of the second schema. There is no 
clear place for the satisfaction relation in the cell biology case. A set of sentences may 
describe the cell model, but the cell model does not satisfy the description in any 
specifiable sense. The notion of satisfaction is a technical term from meta-mathemat­
ics with no correlate in many cases of scientific model construction.
Further, in the scientific case we are interested in more than just the satisfaction re­
lation, for an account of theories that does any justice to scientific practice we need to 
say something about the relation between models and empirical systems they purport­
edly model. Of course holders of the semantic view have such a concept, my symbol 
='!= above is captured by isomorphism. Before turning to this a brief note is in order 
about the pendulum case.
We observed that in the case of the pendulum there was no real system that corre­
sponded to the equation. In fact as Giere has pointed out (1988) there are few models 
in classical mechanics that bear a close relation to empirical systems. In this case per­
haps the similarity between the scientific and the logical case is more apparent.
Giere’s weaker version of Suppes and Van Fraassen's claims above is that the termi­
nology in classical mechanics “overlaps nicely with the usage of logicians, for whom 
a model of a set of axioms is an object, or set of objects, that satisfies the axioms” 
(1988, p. 79). But even in the case of classical mechanics there is some sense in ask­
ing the question “What is the relation between the pendulum satisfying the equation, 
and the pendulum in my high-school physics laboratory?” No such corresponding 
question can be asked in the meta-mathematical case.
Notice, also, that the notion of embedding partially captures the relations between 
the pendulum and other linear oscillators. The equation for any linear oscillator is a 
more general equation than the equation for the horizontal component of the pendu­
lum, and a model for a linear oscillator satisfies the equation for the pendulum. The 
pendulum is embedded in the linear oscillator because the pendulum is in some sense 
isomorphic to a sub-structure of the linear oscillator.
Giere, following many other semantic theorists, separates out appropriate ques­
tions philosophers should ask about scientific theories: ‘“What are scientific theo­
ries?’ and ‘How do theories function in various scientific activities’” (1988, p. 62).
Proposing that theories in meta-mathematics are very similar to theories in science is 
to pursue the former structural issue unconstrained by the latter procedural issue.
Most holders of the semantic view, despite their position on the relative status of 
meta-mathematics and science, do have a story to tell about the relation between mod­
els and empirical systems. The semantic view is an attempt to give a general account 
of the nature of scientific theories, and to give an account that only worked for classi­
cal mechanics would not be sufficient.
Isomorphism is a relation between mathematical structures. If there is a function 
that maps each element of one structure onto each element of another the structures 
are isomorphic. What is more useful is the idea that some structures can be isomor­
phic to a sub-structure of a larger structure. A case of this relation was introduced in 
the geometry example, where we saw that the triangle is embedded in the euclidian 
plane as it is isomorphic with a substructure of the theory of Euclidian geometry.
When we turn from the mathematical to the scientific case there are some problems 
with the use of isomorphism.
Reconsider the following schema:
{empirical system) =?= MODEL ===> {theory, equation,...}
The operator =?= is generally taken by semantic theorists (Suppes 1967, Suppe 1977, 
Van Fraassen 1980a) to stand for isomorphism, but scientific cases strain the clear 
mathematical sense of isomorphism. Certainly when dealing at the level of the rela­
tions between parts and levels of a theory isomorphism is a useful relation. As long as 
the theory is expressible mathematically and has clearly delineable models, then its 
sub-theories and lower level theories can be shown to be isomorphic to sub-structures 
of the larger theory. This is clear in the classical mechanics case.
Where the semantic view needs isomorphism to do most of its work is between 
models and empirical systems. Lloyd, who is aware of the difficulties with the notion 
of isomorphism (1988, p. 14), gives an example of how the relation works in the lo­
gistic equation case. As we saw above she claimed that if the growth curve for an em­
pirical system, say a population of yeast, was the same as the curve from the logistic 
equation, then the empirical system and the model are isomorphic. But here Lloyd 
herself notes “in practice, the relationship between theoretical and empirical model is 
typically weaker than isomorphism, usually a homomorphism, or sometimes an even 
weaker type of morphism” (1988, p. 14 fn. 2).
The kind of relation that exists between empirical systems and theoretical models 
is simply not the isomorphism of mathematics. There are a few reasons for the ten­
dency to hang onto the term isomorphism. One stems from Van Fraassen’s anti-real­
ism. Van Fraassen (1980a) speaks of empirical systems rather than real systems, so 
that he can consistently argue for his view that theories need only be empirically ade­
quate. Rather than theories mapping onto real systems, they map onto empirical struc­
tures derived from observations. So the isomorphism at work is always between well 
defined structures.
A further reason for the usage is that holders of the semantic view have concen­
trated on highly mathematical theories. For example, the empirical structures that Van 
Fraassen refers to are expressible entirely mathematically. If, by contrast, we consider 
what relation there is between a schematized cell model and what I observe of a 
stained piece of muscle tissue through a light microscope, we have a case where the 
application of the notion of isomorphism looks very strained. And yet this is closely
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analogous to the relation that holds between the curve for the logistic equation and the 
curve for the yeast population.
Giere (1988) believes he has an answer to these kinds of problems. He substitutes 
the term “similarity” for isomorphism. Models are similar in various respects and de­
grees to empirical systems (1988, p. 81). But Giere is also more sanguine about real 
systems. He invokes similarity between models and real systems, because he is a real­
ist. Without passing judgment on whether models are similar to real systems or empir­
ical systems, we can still assess what is gained by introducing similarity as the candi­
date relation for =?=.
Giere’s introduction of the notion of similarity gets him out of the difficulties asso­
ciated with the strong relation of isomorphism, at the expense of distancing his ac­
count of science from any account of logic or meta-mathematics. At best we can say 
that the use of models in mathematics inspired the semantic view of theories, but we 
are not entitled to any of the strong claims that models in science and mathematics are 
the same.
What appears to be the case is that on the semantic view one needs an account of 
the relation between theoretical and empirical models that can handle all the kinds of 
models that occur in science. In many cases neither the models nor the empirical sys­
tems are, or can be, expressed mathematically, so isomorphism will not do the trick. 
Giere’s similarity relation appears to solve some of these problems, so for now let us 
assume that this is the kind of relation we are looking for.* I now turn to a specific set 
of criticisms that lead to a deflationary version of the semantic view of theories.
4. A Deflationary Semantic View
Several holders of the semantic view (Suppes I960, Suppe 1977, Van Fraassen 
1980a) propose a general account of the nature of scientific theories. My illustrations 
of the difficulties with the notion of models above leads to the following question: Is 
such a strong generalized version of the semantic view tenable? 1 will address this 
question by showing how different versions of the semantic view arise when different 
sciences are examined. I then ask whether holders of the semantic view should be sat­
isfied with a more piecemeal and descriptivist version.
Suppes (1960), Van Fraassen (1980a) and Suppe (1977) share the view that an im­
portant part of the philosophical investigation of science is to give an account of the 
structure and content of scientific theories. Van Fraassen refers to this task as “foun­
dational work” (1980a, p. 2). Much of what was at stake in the initial presentations of 
the semantic view of theories was to provide an analysis that would answer all the 
questions logical empiricists had about the nature of theories in a more coherent fash­
ion. Marc Ereshefsky (1991) has clearly laid out the issues at stake here. There is a 
problem with emphasizing this motivation for the adoption of the semantic view, 
which is that the explanatory agenda is not being laid out by explananda in science, 
rather by explananda that were of interest to logical empiricist philosophers. When 
Ereshefsky assesses the semantic view he does so by contrasting it with the received 
view thus reinforcing these terms of contrast. For, although he is not a defender of the 
received view, one could conclude from his criticisms that a return to the received 
view is in order as the semantic view does not hold up.
An alternative motivation for the semantic view, emphasized by Giere (1988) and 
Lloyd (1988), and more recently by Griesemer (1990), is that the view provides a 
more adequate description of theories as they are represented in actual scientific prac­
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tice. This motivation leads to a proliferation of views under the rubric of the semantic 
view. Philosophers of science closely following a particular piece of scientific theoriz­
ing present an account that most closely resembles that particular science. This is fine 
if no general account of the structure and content of scientific theories is required, but 
if it is, then there is a problem. Let us first consider some examples.
Lloyd (1988) presents a detailed analysis of evolutionary theory, specifically popu­
lation genetics. Her aim is to demonstrate the logical structure of evolutionary theory 
by elucidating the structure of its models. In doing this Lloyd claims that she “demon­
strate [s] the usefulness of a precise analysis of the structure of evolutionary theory” 
(1988, p. 23), and that she offers “further evidence for the appropriateness and utility 
of the semantic view of theories” (1988, 23).
The account Lloyd presents closely follows those in the biological literature. For 
example, her account of the general structure of population genetics closely follows 
Lewontin’s (1974), Certainly such close attention to the detail of biological theorizing 
produces useful results, in that Lloyd provides new and useful insight into many prob­
lem areas in both philosophy and theoretical biology, especially the units of selection 
issue. The question is to what extent her approach is generalizable, and, more specifi­
cally, generalizable as a version of the semantic view of theories.
Lloyd emphasizes, as do Suppes and Van Fraassen, the importance of mathemati­
cal models, and the use of a precise formal approach. In the kinds of cases these au­
thors consider this is a reasonable emphasis. The problem is that, although Lloyd 
(1988, p. 16) claims that the semantic approach does not attempt to delineate scientif­
ic from non-scientific theories, there is something of an implicit demarcation criterion 
at work here. As we saw in the discussion of models above, there are distinctly non- 
mathematical models in science. Elucidating theorizing involving these models can­
not rely on a formal approach of the kind Lloyd presents, and even less on such a spe­
cific formal approach involving state spaces, laws, and parameters.
What is at stake here is not the value of Lloyd’s contribution to understanding evo­
lutionary biology, rather the integrity of a strong version of the semantic view of theo­
ries. Certainly she holds that model construction is crucial to our understanding of 
theorizing, but this is a much weaker position than one that says that all theories are 
families of mathematical models. It is my contention that gaining descriptive and ex­
planatory insight into scientific theorizing is an adequate goal for philosophers of sci­
ence, even in the absence of a general account of the nature of scientific theories. Let 
us now look at some more examples to try and strengthen the claim that there is no 
one strong semantic view of the nature of theories.
Qiere’s discussion of linear oscillators that we considered above is clearly a candi­
date for a formal analysis in terms of mathematical models. This example can be quite 
easily accommodated in a state space type account such as Lloyd’s, this was shown 
previously by Van Fraassen (1980a) in his discussion of classical mechanics. If this 
was the only kind of case Giere (1988) examined it would perhaps lend support to the 
idea that there was one semantic approach, but Giere examines several different cases 
notably the revolution in geology.
Giere’s (1988) version of the semantic view contains a twist that no previous seman­
tic theorists endorse, which is a certain kind of naturalistic approach with an emphasis on 
cognitive science. This leads to a confusion over just exactly what models are for Giere. 
When he discusses classical mechanics he claims that scientific theories are families of 
models, and that models are constructed abstract entities. So far he directly follows Van
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Fraassen. He goes on to say that models are "socially constructed entities” (1988, p. 78). 
Later, Giere introduces models as kinds of mental representations. So when he discusses 
the geological revolution he refers to the “mental models” various individual geologists 
possessed. Here he leans on accounts of representation derived from cognitive science. 
Certainly at this point we have a proliferation of views on the table.
Models can now be mathematical objects, which are socially, or otherwise, construct­
ed entities, and mental representations of some sort Now in Giere’s geological case 
study there were two large scale crude models, the static model and the mobile model. 
Each of these consisted of families of more detailed models of various geological phe­
nomena, for example on the mobilists account a clear pictorial model of sea floor spread­
ing was developed (Giere 1988, pp. 249-270). These kinds of models, irrespective of 
whether they are mental models, are non-mathematical models, and Giere’s investigation 
of them is not a formal analysis such as that of Lloyd, Van Fraassen or Suppes,
Giere is obviously working with a deflationary version of the semantic view. His 
notion of models extends over all manner of objects, including the mental models of 
the cognitive psychologists (e.g., Johnson Laird 1983). This is strategic on his part, as 
he not only wishes to dissociate himself from logical empiricist philosophy of science, 
but also from approaches that rely only on a formal analysis of the structure of theo­
ries. Giere’s naturalism leads him to investigate scientific theorizing in all its forms. 
Although Giere claims that “theories are families of models”, his view could be more 
adequately characterized as the deflationary: model construction is an important com­
ponent of scientific theorizing. Far from following through the alleged similarities be­
tween scientific theories and those of meta-mathematics, Giere brings in as many inter­
pretations of the term “model” as suit his ends. I will comment on his reference to 
mental models at the end of the paper, but first I provide a third example of a propo­
nent of the semantic view who contributes to the proliferation of semantic views.
Griesemer (1990) used a case study of the naturalist Joseph Grinnell to “enrich the 
semantic conception of theories” (1990,11). Griesemer adds the following two im­
portant model types to all the above models involved in scientific theorizing. The first 
are entities as models, of which one of the most famous is Watson and Crick’s wire 
and bead model of DNA. These kinds of models are different from the schematized 
cell referred to above, because their representational capacities are enhanced by our 
ability to physically manipulate them. The second type of model, and the most impor­
tant for Griesemer’s paper, are “remnant models”. An example of this kind of model 
is a museum specimen of an animal or plant. Griesemer’s introduction of these further 
types of model are a result of his move away from specifying theories in terms of the 
kinds of logical structures they are, and towards accounts of scientific theorizing. This 
is the move I advocated at the outset of the paper, one that Giere makes to a certain 
extent, but Griesemer pushes further.
One puzzling aspect of Griesemer’s account is his insistence that he is enriching 
the semantic view of theories. By the time we have admitted laboratory specimens 
and physical objects to the domain of models, the idea that theories are families of 
models becomes quite inclusive. The less liberally inclined might be moved to claim 
that the semantic view is a non-view, because just about anything counts as an exten­
sion to it, or an enrichment of it. My approach is to claim that there is no such thing as 
one semantic view of theories, but work on such an approach led us to a fruitful way 
to study scientific theorizing and that is to investigate model constructing practices.
This is almost the position Griesemer arrives at, but not quite. His emphasis on 
theorizing as a practice is evident in the following passage:
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We can ... distinguish two semantic routes to theory introduction, one in terms 
of abstract models and one in terms of material models. On the classical se­
mantic view, a theory is specified by defining the mathematical structures that 
satisfy the propositions of the theory. On an extended semantic view, a theory 
can be specified by defining a class of models as the set of physical structures 
constructed according to a given procedure or tradition. (1990, p. 12)
A clear way of lessening the contrast between these two views, is simply to re-phrase 
the definition of the classical view in terms of socially constructed entities also. Then 
all investigations of scientific theorizing involve the investigation of the practice of 
constructing models. And also on this view all investigations would have to go be­
yond the individual theorizer as a locus, as Griesemer (1990, p. 5) has pointed out.
What we have seen from the three examples is not so much a series of extensions 
to one semantic view of theories, but a set of alternative proposals for the investiga­
tion of scientific theorizing. Lloyd’s proposal is to pay close attention to the formal 
structures produced by theorists, Giere’s is to develop an account of theorizing as the 
manipulation of mental models, and Griesemer’s to account for theorizing that in­
volves the practices of using physical objects as models. I claim that what is common 
to all these views is best understood as the somewhat weak claim that model construc­
tion is an important part of scientific theorizing. This claim is not weak when we con­
sider the progress various versions of the semantic view have made over the received 
view. The key mark of this progress is the ability for philosophers to provide insight 
into detailed and specific cases of scientific theorizing. What could be considered the 
chief source of weakness is the lack of a general account of the nature of theories. I 
will close with some concluding remarks about the potential fruitfulness of the defla­
tionary account for naturalized philosophy of science.
5. Conclusions
My criticisms are not an outright rejection of the semantic view of theories, in fact 
I embrace some of the insights of the semantic view, but only in so far as they are 
contained in the deflationary semantic view. That is that model construction is an im­
portant part of scientific theorizing. What lies behind my criticisms is a view of how 
to approach issues in the philosophy of science. Any reconstruction of a domain of 
scientific practice in terms of identity statements such as “theories are families of 
models” can only give us limited purchase on making sense of science. The deflation­
ary version of the semantic view of theories is an attempt to leave room for accounts 
of types of scientific theorizing that may not fit the model building mould. The strong 
view has to provide an analysis of scientific theorizing that forces any and all types of 
theorizing into this mould. Although I happily acquiesce to the claim that much theo­
rizing in science involves the development and testing of models, I do not agree that a 
sufficient account of scientific theorizing is allowed by the claim that all scientific 
theories are simply families of models.
What is implicitly rejected on my view is that there are a special set of issues, re­
ferred to by Van Fraassen (1980b) as internal issues, whose investigation supplies suf­
ficient activity for philosophers of science. Once theorizing is focussed on, rather than 
theories as completed formal entities, distinctions between internal and external issues 
become hard, if not impossible to make. On the deflationary view, philosophers of 
science form a loose confederacy for studying scientific theorizing, gathered around 
the common insight that model building is one of the most important components of 
such theorizing.
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This kind of approach, which I take to be naturalistic, opens up many avenues of 
inquiry. As Griesemer has pointed out, echoing many sociologists of science before 
him, the examination of scientific theorizing will require an examination of the social 
nature of scientific practice. Giere’s focus on the notion of models as mental represen­
tations also deserves attention. It does not appear to be the case that an account of 
models as simply some kind of mental representation will do justice to scientific theo­
rizing, as the Griesemer case should indicate, but Giere’s emphasis on the psychologi­
cal does point to an important set of problems about scientific theorizing. For exam­
ple, it is not clear just exactly what the representational status of theories is, or if they 
are representational at all. Certainly models are representations in some sense, but 
even their representational status is unclear. This is emphasized by the difficulty of 
finding a suitable alternative to isomorphism, and whether, once arrived at, such an al­
ternative will apply to mental models in the same way it applies to socially construct­
ed abstract models. Further, it is an open question just exactly how much scientific 
theorizing can be usefully and fruitfully carried out by individual scientists without 
the assistance of their peers. This leads to questions about our individual cognitive ca­
pacities, and how they are enhanced by the addition of other theorists.
If one pays attention to only the fine detail of the formal construction of theories, I 
contend that the above issues remain unaddressed. It could be argued that the formal 
investigations are sufficient, but I propose that they will only be useful if they go hand 
in hand with the other kinds of investigation encompassed by a naturalistic approach
lo the philosophy of science.
Notes
*1 am grateful to Arthur Fine and Todd Grantham for discussing the semantic view 
of theories with me, and to David Hull and Tom Ryckman for comments on drafts of 
the paper. Financial support was provided by a post-doctoral fellowship from 
Northwestern University.
2Space prevents me from going into the reasons for rejecting Giere’s similarity re­
lation, which is also inadequate for its proposed task. Suffice to say that similarity 
avoids some of the problems associated with isomorphism, but may bring with it 
many more of a different nature. Cummins’ (1989) discussion of similarity as a repre­
sentation relation provides a good introduction to some of these problems.
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